ABSTRACT At present, several post-quantum cryptosystems have been proposed, and lattice-based cryptography is the main candidate. Especially in the direction of digital signatures, there are now many practical lattice-based signature schemes. However, there exist few lattice-based signatures with special property such as blind signature. Blind signature was introduced by Chaum for creating untraceable payment system. Then, it is widely used in e-cash and voting, especially in the revolutionary digital cash system based on blockchain. In our paper, we present a method to construct a post-quantum blind signature based on lattice assumptions, and we proved that any existential forger against the security of the resulting scheme can solve the SIS q,n,m,β problem for β = O(dn). Our main technique is the rejection sampling theory. The expected number of times needed to output a blind signature is at most e 2 under aborting, and our new scheme has much smaller signature size than those of all the previously proposed blind signature schemes over lattices.
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the main candidates for creating post-quantum cryptosystems, lattice-based cryptography is considered as a most promising alternative approach of standard assumptions such as standard cryptosystems including RSA, and others. And NIST is preparing to standardize the post-quantum cryptosystems [2] . According to NIST, lattice-based cryptography is the main candidate. In the direction of digital signatures, although there are many practical post-quantum signatures based on lattices [3] - [7] , there exist few lattice-based signatures with special properties such as blind, group, and ring signature schemes. In fact, the main blind signature scheme based on lattice is proposed by Rückert [17] .
However, blind signature is getting more attention recently because of the emergence of digital cash system based on blockchain. In fact, those signature schemes with special properties are the foundational tools for creating digital cash system, and the blind signature can provide anonymous authentication in this digital cash system. What is more, blind signature has been widely used to construct e-cash and voting agreement. For example, the anonymity of e-cash is usually achieved by a blind signature scheme, and the e-cash system with blind signature has the property that an individual spending can not be determined even if all parties collude [9] , [10] . As for voting system, rather than the ''public use'' of blockchain (it guarantees the transparency of voting), blind signature has the ''secret use'' property which provides anonymous authentication [12] .
Blind signature was introduced by Chaum [1] for creating untraceable payment system. It allows a user to receive a signature σ of a message m without knowing the signing key. However, the signer know nothing about m and its signature σ . The security of blind signature protocol by Juels et al. [13] and Pointcheval and Stern [14] has to satisfy blindness and one-more unforgeability. Blindness says that a signer can sign a message without knowing it. But one-more unforgeability allows the signer to control the excepted number of valid signatures.
A. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Our scheme is built via the underlying identification scheme of blind signature by Pointcheval [15] . It seems that the analogous method can be directly used to construct latticebased identification scheme as well, but it is nontrivial, since the lattices allow for much less algebraic structure. More specifically, if we directly apply the approach to lattice-based identification without combining other methods, the response of the prover will leak information about his secret key. In this work, we will solve this difficulty by aborting, which is a vital tool in lattice-based cryptography. The idea behind it is that one can select to stop the interactive protocol in case that his secret key is leaked.
We now present the identification scheme over lattice assumptions, and we will take the SIS problem as an example. The prover takes S ← Z m×k q as the secret key, and A ← Z n×m q as well as T ← AS as the public keys. Then the 3-move identification scheme is roughly proposed as follows:
• The prover samples x ← D, where D is some probability distribution;
• Send commitment y ← Ax to the verifier;
• The verifier samples a challenge e at random, and send it to the prover;
• The prover's response is r ← x + Se;
• Send response r to the verifier under aborting;
• The verifier verifies Ar = y + Te. The aborting used above ensures that the response r will leak nothing about the secret key S [22] . Generally speaking, in order to achieve aborting, there are two techniques. The rejection sampling lemma [19] is an another aborting technique which we will use in our work. The ideal behind it is that given a probability distribution f , we want to find another distribution g such that f (x) ≤ Mg(x) for almost all x, where M is some position constant. Then the distribution that x ← g and is accepted with f (x)/Mg(x) is exactly f , and M is the expected number of times needed to output a sample, it is vital to make M as small as possible. Note that in our work, in fact, the process of finding the distribution of g is exactly the process of constructing our blind signature scheme.
Unlike those blind signatures based on factoring and discrete logarithm, in the lattice-based blind signatures, the signer must verify whether the user has obtained a valid signature or not, in case that the malicious user may ask the signer to restart the signing protocol, despite having already obtained a valid signature.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notations: Throughout our paper, q is a polynomial-size prime number and
We will represent vectors (considered as column vectors) by bold lowercase letters, and matrices by bold uppercase letters. We say that it follows the uniform distribution if x ← S for set S. If S is a probability distribution, we say x is chosen according to S. Let X and Y be two random variable, then their statistical distance is defined as
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC DEFINITIONS
A blind signature BS consists of 3 polynomial-time algorithms. In the Key generation algorithm, the signer keeps his secret key sk. The Sign algorithm is showed in Figure 1 , the user firstly computes a blinded message m * , and send it to the signer. The signer generates its corresponding signature σ * , then the user uses the σ * to obtain a valid signature σ for m. Verification algorithm Verify takes (pk, m, σ ), and outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject). We say that BS is correct if for all message m ∈ M and (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(·), we have Verify(pk, m, σ ) = 1.
As for security, BS has to satisfy blindness and one-more unforgeability [13] , [14] . The blindness says that a malicious signer S * can only see views that are independent of the message being signed. We let S * U (pk,m b ;m 1−b ) 2 (·) denote that S * can invoke two executions (m b and m 1−b ) with an honest user U. Let σ b be the blind signature output of U(pk, m b ), and σ 1−b be the corresponding U(pk, m 1−b ), and if one of the signature outputs is failure, the game will be suspended. Then the advantage of S * is defined as
The one-more unforgeability ensures that an malicious user U * can only generate at most l valid message-signatures pairs, where l is the number of successful interactions, then the advantage of U * is defined as
We say a blind signature protocol is blind if the advantage Adv blind BS (S * ) of all adversaries are negligible, and it is one-more unforgeable if the corresponding advantage Adv omf BS (U * ) are all negligible after limited queries to the signing oracle.
B. LATTICES
A subset of n-dimensional Euclidean vector space R n is a lattice if and only if it is a discrete subgroup under addition of (R n , +). Formally, a lattice L is the set of all integer combinations
where b 1 , · · · , b n are n linearly independent vectors in R n , and n is its dimensional. We call the matrix
the bases of lattice L(B).
The hard problem underlying the security of our protocol is based on the average-case assumption of small integer solution (SIS) problem, which is defined below [20] .
Definition 1 [20] : The inhomogeneous SIS q,n,m,β problem consists in finding a pre-image s satisfying As = t and s ≤ β, where
The homogeneous version of the SIS q,n,m,β problem is defined with the target t = 0 and the solution s = 0 being disallowed.
Define modulus lattice ∧ ⊥ q = {x ∈ Z m : Ax = 0 mod q}, then SIS problem can be considered to find a nonzero lattice vector of length at most β in ∧ ⊥ q . The SIS problem was first defined by Ajtai [20] , and in his seminal work, he showed that solving the random instances of the SIS q,n,m,β problem can be reduced to solve certain worst-case problems in lattices. Micciancio and Regev [21] tightened up the result, and showed that the random instances of the SIS q,n,m,β problem can be reduced to solve the O(β √ n)-SIVP problem in all lattices.
C. GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION AND REJECTION SAMPLING 1) GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION
The Gaussian distribution is defined by ρ c,σ (x) = exp(
2 ), where σ ∈ R is its standard deviation, and c ∈ R n is the center. If c = 0, we generally simply write ρ σ (x). The discrete Gaussian distribution over Z centered at 0 is defined by D σ (x) = ρ σ (x)/ρ σ (Z), and more generally,
. The below lemma [21] about the discrete Gaussian distribution ensures the signature in our BS scheme is not so large.
Lemma 1 [21] : For k ≥ 1, it follows that
What is more, for any vector v ∈ R m and σ, r > 0, we have
The following lemma [21] will be used in our rejection sampling lemma. Lemma 2 [21] :
2) REJECTION SAMPLING
The rejection sampling lemma is an aborting technique that is especially used in lattice-based cryptography. The idea behind it is that one can select to stop the interactive protocol in case that his secret key is leaked. That is, given a probability distribution f , we want to find another distribution g such that f (x) ≤ Mg(x) for almost all x, where M is some position constant. Then the distribution that x ← g and is accepted with f (x)/Mg(x) is exactly f , and M is the expected number of times needed to output a sample. More specifically, we have the following rejection sampling lemma [19] . Lemma 3 [19] : Let V ⊆ Z m , and h is a distribution that V maps to R. If σ = ω(T √ log m), then there exists a constant M such that the following distribution:
of the following distribution:
3. output (z, v) with probability min(
III. OUR BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON SIS
In this section, we will present our lattice-based blind signature scheme, which is based on the average-case of the SIS problem. It follows a 3-move identification scheme over lattices in essence, and we have introduced it in our introduction. The sign algorithm is an interactive protocol which is presented in Figure 2 , and we show its carefully chosen parameters in Table 1 in section V. We will now give a detailed description of the blind signature scheme.
A. KEY GENERATION
The algorithm generates A ← Z n×m q , and for simplify, the secret key S ← {−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d} m×k , to ensure the security and efficiency, the positive integer d is small. The public key consists of matrix A and another n × k matrix T ← AS. The security of S is based on the inhomogeneous SIS problem.
B. SIGN ALGORITHM
Sign algorithm is a 4-move interactive protocol between a singer S and a user U, we simplify it in Figure 2 . To sign a message µ, the singer transmits a commitment x ← Ar for a random vector r ← D m , and computes x + Aa + Tb, then hash it with a commitment C = com(µ, t), where hash function H : {0, 1} * → {v ∈ {−1, 0, 1} k , v 1 ≤ κ}, The resulting value c is known as a part of the final signature output. In order to hide c, the singer sends e = c + b to the user with some probability, which we will detail in the next paragraph. After obtaining e, the user computes y = r + Se and sends it to the singer, the process also restarts with some probability, and it is necessary to make VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. Our lattice-based blind signature protocol.
sure that nothing information of S is leaked for security. Then the user computes z = y + a, and regards (z, c, t) as the final blind signatures, the probability is used to make sure that the signature z is independent of y for blindness. Note that each interaction run is independent because of the hash function, we do not have to take commitments into consideration here.
In addition, in our signing protocol, the set J is the rejection area in the rejection sampling lemma, which is the area between the graphs of D m . That is, if the signature z ∈ J , then it is invalid. Thus, the user can ask the signer to restart the protocol. It is noted that the user must send the result to the signer, and the signer will verify the user whether has obtained a valid signature or not. In this case, the signer can detect that a malicious user tries to restart the signing protocol, despite having obtained a valid signature.
What calls for special attention is that we need consider the blindness and one-more unforgeability, but this is non-trivial in lattice because of its algebraic structure. First, the scheme need to be blind to singer, thai is, neither e nor z is independent of message µ. Second, as for unforgeability, commitment x and partial signature y should not leak any information about the secret key S. This is why and where we will use the rejection sampling lemma. Take z = y + a as an example, in order to ensure that the distribution of the signature z is independent of y, the user output z with probability min{D m , which is independent of y. Similarly, the technique can also be applied to another two places to achieve blindness and unforgeability.
C. VERIFICATION
Verify(A, T , µ, z, c, t) = 1 iff z ≤ η √ mσ 3 and c = H (Az − Tc, com(µ, t)), where η is bigger than 1, so that the probability of verification algorithm is about 1 − 2 −λ for the security parameter λ.
D. REPETITION RATE M
Since M is the expected number of times needed to output a sample, it is important to keep it as small as possible. In order to ensure the correctness, we have the probability
Lemma 1 tells us that | z, v | ≤ 12 v σ , so we have
Thus we can set M = exp(
).
IV. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY
Now, we will prove that our protocol is correctness under aborting, what is more, we will prove its blindness and onemore unforgeability in the random oracle. Therefore H (Az − Tc, com(µ, t)) = c, note that with overwhelming probability z ≤ η √ mσ 3 for η > 1 by lemma 1, thus we have verify (A, T , (c, z), com(µ, t) 
A. CORRECTNESS UNDER ABORTING
Now we analyze the repetition of the scheme. Note that the probability
v,σ (z) in our scheme is not bigger than 1, according to our previous analysis,
To keep M as small as possible, thus we can set M = exp(
). Note that the aborting of outputting e does not affect correctness, since the user can do it locally. So after at most 3 i=2 M i = e 2 repetitions, the scheme can successfully produce a valid blind signature.
B. BLINDNESS
Blindness is a fundamental property required by blind signatures, it says that the signer can only see views that are independent of the message being signed. That is, the dishonest signer can not distinguish the views generated by different messages. . That is, the statistical distance (e b , e 1−b ) = 0, and they are distributed independently of the message being singed.
As for the signature z, which is similar to e, let z b and z 1−b be the signature of U(pk, µ b ) resp. U(pk, µ 1−b ), since z = y+ a and output it with probability min(D m
(z), 1), thus by the rejection sampling lemma, the statistical distance (z b , z 1−b ) = 0. In a word, the outputs of the users are independent of their corresponding messages being signed.
C. ONE-MORE UNFORGEABILITY
The one-more unforgeability ensures that an malicious user U * can only generate at most l valid signatures, where l is the number of successful interactions. In this paper, we prove that any existential forger against one-more unforgeability about our blind signature can find a solution to the SIS q,n,m,β problem for β = 2(ησ 3 + dκ) √ m. Theorem 3: Suppose there is an adversary F which is against one-more unforgeability of our blind signature with non negligible probability δ, l and h are the number of queries to the blind signing oracle and random oracle H , respectively. Then there must exist a polynomial-time algorithm F which can find a solution to the SIS q,n,m,β problem for β = 2(ησ 3 + dκ) √ m with probability ≈ δ 2 2(l+h) . Proof of Theorem 3: Our proof follows the fact that the output of our blind signature is independent of the signing key, and when the adversary is against one-more unforgeability, the simulator can extract an answer to the SIS problem. We now prove it by two lemmas, Lemma 4 shows that the statistical distance between the two outputs of our blind signing algorithm and Algorithm 1 is at most l(l + h)2 −n+1 . Then in lemma 5, we show that if a forger can be against one-more unforgeability with probability δ when our scheme is replaced by Algorithm 1, then with probability ≈ proof of Lemma 4: We first construct a algorithm 2 (Hybrid 2) as follows, where B k := {v ∈ {−1, 0, 1} k : v 1 ≤ κ}. Which is same to the real blind signing algorithm except the output c of the random oracle, and we will show that with probability at most l(l +h)2 −n+1 the distinguisher D can distinguish the actual blind signing protocol form algorithm 2. Let w = r+a+Sb, then Aw = x+Aa+Tb. In algorithm 2, we know that c ← B k , and it is considered as an answer to H (Az − Tc, µ) = H (Aw, µ). Since h and l are the number of queries of D to the random oracle H and the blind signing protocol, respectively. Then we know that the values (Aw, µ) will ever be set at most h + l values. Now we will prove that each time the distinguish D queries algorithm 2, with probability at most 2 −n+1 D can generate a value y such find a non-zero answer with probability at least 1 2 . In conclusion, we can find a nonzero vector v such that v ≤ 2(ησ 3 + dκ) √ m and Av = 0 with probability at least
.
Combining lemma 4 and 5, suppose there a adversary F is against one-more unforgeability of our blind signature scheme with probability δ. Then there must exist a polynomial-time algorithm which can solve the SIS q,n,m,β problem for β = 2(ησ 3 + dκ) √ m = O(dn) with probability ≈ δ 2 2(l+h) . Thus we complete the proof of Theorem 3. Remark:If the public and secret key in our scheme satisfy the relationship AS = qI n (mod 2q) as [6] , where A ← Z n×m 2q , and S ← {−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d} m×k . We can present a tighter and much simpler proof than Type 2 for β = 2ησ 3 √ m of SIS q,n,m,β problem, only by slightly changing the size of public key. In fact, we can obtain
from (1) . Since c j − c j = 0, we have z − z = 0 mod 2q. With overwhelming probability we have z ∞ , z ∞ ≤ q/4, thus z − z ∞ < q/2, so we have v := z − z = 0 mod q. Note that q(c j − c j )I n = 0 mod q. Finally, we have Av = 0 mod q, and v ≤ 2ησ 3 √ m, that is, we find a nonzero solution v to a SIS q,n,m,β problem.
V. PARAMETERS SETTING AND COMPARISON

A. PARAMETERS SETTING
In Table 1 , we set some sample parameters for our scheme. The methodology for choosing these parameters is the same as in [19] , in other words, we use the notion of the Hermite factor δ = 1.007 defined in [24] , which is considered to have around 80 bits of security. The free parameters n, q, k need to make sure that the SIS problem is computationally infeasible. To prove the security, we set m = 64 + n log q/ log(2d + 1), which is used in lemma 6. The parameter κ defines the size of the challenges, in order to have correctness error of at most 2 −100 , κ should satisfy 2 κ k κ ≥ 2 100 . For σ = 12 v from lemma 2, we have known that
3) in our scheme, which is independent of v and σ . For simplicity, we take M 1 as an example, set σ 1 = 12 c = 12 √ κ, so we have M 1 = exp(12 √ κ/σ 1 + κ/2σ 2 1 ). As for the signature size, it mainly depends on the vector z, since c is just a small bit-string. As we have known that z is distributed according to D m σ 3
, by lemma 1, each coefficient of z is of length at most 12σ 3 with probability at least 1 − 2 −100 . Thus approximate signature size is equal to m log(12σ 3 ) bits.
B. COMPARISON
In Table 2 , we list a table which shows a comparison of the blind signature protocols. It includes the RSA blind signature, Rückert's lattice-based blind signature [17] , and our scheme. The RSA scheme does not provide post-quantum security. The public key of our scheme is bigger than that of Rückert's scheme, but our scheme has much smaller signature size, although our security level is 80 bit, which is a bit bigger than other two ones.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We present an alternative method for constructing postquantum latticed-based blind signature using one of the aborting techniques. In addition, perhaps the aborting in the signing process is inevitable in lattices, but the verification algorithm may be accepted without aborting. The analogous binomial distribution [23] may be an alternative and feasible approach instead of Gaussian distribution, of course, the advantage of binomial distribution is far beyond that.
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